Introduction
In the last decade a number of emergent, or reemergent, diseases have reminded us of the constant threat posed by infectious diseases. These diseases affect humans, animals, plants, or multiple species, as recently demonstrated by the occurrence of zoonotic diseases, such as Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS), avian influenza (H5N1), and the more recent influenza variant, H1N1. In each case, the rapid global spread of these diseases created enormous pressure on governments to diagnose, treat, and control the outbreaks. Thus, governments and international agencies were forced to examine their diagnostic, treatment, and research capacity for infectious diseases (Chan, 2010) . In many low-resource countries, laboratory capacity was found to be inadequate and facilities poorly maintained (Kruk, 2008; The PLoS Medicine Editors, 2007; Wertheim, 2010; World Health Assembly, 2005) . These findings generated increased interest from local governments, international agencies, and development partners to improve diagnostic, treatment, and research capabilities for both human and animal health in lowresource countries. The revised International Health Regulations (IHR) (WHO, 2005) call for all member states to rapidly detect, prevent, and respond to human and animal disease outbreaks. The regulations provide a framework to mobilize technical support and material resources in response to any disease pandemic. Laboratory biosafety and biosecurity are explicitly identified as critical components of IHR Core Capacity 8: Laboratory (www.who.int /ihr/IHR_Monitoring_Framework_Checklist_ and_Indicators.pdf). This core capacity relates to laboratory services at each phase of infectious disease alert and response including detection, investigation and response, sample analysis performed in domestic laboratories, and shipment of specimens to collaborating centers. To fully and successfully reach this prescribed capacity, biosafety procedures must be improved or supplemented and regularly monitored, and laboratory biorisk assessments must be conducted to guide and update biosafety regulations, practices, and procedures. While the requirement to identify and control disease outbreaks has increased diagnostic capacity (i.e., more facilities, more testing, more agent isolations), unfortunately, no corresponding increase in biosafety and biosecurity capacity has occurred. This is especially true in countries with limited resources.
Any country operating laboratories that provide some combination of diagnostic, clinical, and /or research activities involving human and /or animal pathogens should have laboratory and vivaria biosafety and biosecurity capabilities. And while all countries need to operate such laboratories, not all countries have the ability or resources to apply appropriate biosafety and biosecurity principles and practices to laboratory opera-
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International Biosafety and Biosecurity Challenges: Suggestions for Developing Sustainable Capacity in Low-resource Countries tions. In fact, biosafety and biosecurity are most compromised in low-resource countries where they are constrained due to numerous challenges. These challenges can be grouped into nine broad categories: 1) Country-/ Region-specific Regulatory Framework and Guidelines or Standards; 2) Biosafety Awareness; 3) Infrastructure; 4) Equipment, Reagents, and Services; 5) Management Processes and Administrative Controls; 6) Biosafety Curricula; 7) Training; 8) Biosafety Associations, Professional Competency, and Credentialing; and 9) Individual Mentoring and Organizational Twinning. It is important to note that the challenges to biorisk management identified in these categories are not unique to low-resource countries; many are common to high-resource countries, as well.
"How best to address the spread of infectious diseases and to ensure the safe handling and secure storage of pathogens in laboratories is a matter of much debate. Gaining consensus is complicated by the fact that solutions that work for one nation may not work well for others due to varying funding priorities, limited resources, absences of regulatory framework, and sometimes ignorance of the risks" (Reed, 2010) . This article identifies specific challenges in each of the nine categories listed above and provides recommendations to the end-user as well as to the international funding community.
The international community of supporters consists of many organizations and groups, including government development agencies, non-governmental aid agencies, large international bodies with global mandates, and individual endowments and trusts. While substantial investment will be required from international development partners, the funding of equipment, reagents, training, and minor facility improvements alone is inadequate to successfully overcome the existing challenges. Low-resource countries and development partners should first assess the full range of country-specific challenges across all nine categories and prioritize their goals against the funds available. This assessment process serves to ensure well-intended support funds are not applied in piecemeal or ineffective fashion. The essential final step is for the development partners and in-country leadership to mutually develop and adhere to a sustainability plan. A successful sustainability plan should define the time-phased transition of all direct and indirect program costs from the funder to the recipient to ensure that program objectives continue to be met in a self-sustainable manner following the depletion of donor funds.
For the purpose of this article, "low-resource" countries are defined as those countries possessing a Human Development Index (HDI) of 0.698 or lower in the 2011 United Nations (UN) Human Development Report (http:/ / hdr.undp.org/ en /statistics/). Countries with a HDI of 0.698 or lower include 94 of 187 countries. Use of the HDI is not meant to indicate that all countries below HDI of 0.698 suffer from an absence of biosafety or biosecurity capacity, rather, this index is referenced simply as a means of defining "low-resource" countries in the absence of a more appropriate quantitative measure or definition for the term.
International Biosafety and Biosecurity Challenges
Country-/Region-specific Regulatory Framework and Guidelines or Standards Establishing and implementing regulatory guidelines or a framework for biological safety, complete with legislation and regulators to oversee implementation is essential for the consistent and uniform application of practices across all containment levels of a country's laboratories and vivaria. Unfortunately, the majority of low-resource countries do not possess a regulatory framework for biosafety and biosecurity management and /or do not consistently adhere to, or formally endorse, the use of any particular guidelines for biosafety or biosecurity.
In establishing national biosafety and biosecurity guidelines, country officials may choose either to adopt or to adapt biosafety and biosecurity guidelines that have been developed by international organizations or other countries. The use of existing documents provides a solid foundation for establishing local biosafety guidelines and leverages existing resources. This approach should be attempted and promoted in countries that do not currently possess a written code of practice (Chua, 2009) . The adaptation and tailoring of existing foreign country or international guidelines to suit the needs of any specific low-resource country are efforts best led by the appropriate Ministry(s) with technical support and input from representatives of national biosafety and other scientific professional associations (if present).
A given country can proceed to create guidelines or standards uniquely suited to its circumstances. The development community should support such actions as a means of establishing a sense of "ownership" among those professionals who will abide by the guideline as a result of having tailored biosafety and biosecurity practices to fit the regulatory oversight, cultural, and material constraints specific to the country. Consultation with existing international regulatory frameworks and stakeholders is imperative throughout the process to ensure compliance with international human and animal health regulations. Careful, country-wide risk assessments must be considered when contemplating the modification of internationally accepted norms; the reason for any deviation must be well substantiated and documented. For maximum benefit, final regulations or standards must be based upon sound principles of biosafety and biosecurity; they must be both mandated and endorsed at the national level.
In some instances, the absence of formal endorsement by the appropriate government ministries means that adopted or adapted guidelines are randomly and inconsistently applied thus generating an inconsistent approach to biosafety and biosecurity. Often this is due to a country's lack of expertise and resources to implement, modify, or manage these guidelines or regulations. In some cases oversight functions are not present and in instances where oversight does exist, government inspectors may not possess the appropriate technical background and /or expertise to oversee the implementation of biosafety or biosecurity regulations. International funders should provide resources in the form of training to overcome these challenges.
Biosafety and Biosecurity Awareness
It is critical for those in positions of power and those who control budgets (e.g., laboratory directors and ministers to which these laboratories report, and elected officials) as well as laboratory scientists and facility managers to have a broad awareness of the importance of biosafety and biosecurity best practices. For international biosafety and biosecurity capacity development initiatives to succeed, the highest levels of government must formally endorse the principles and practices of biosafety and biosecurity risk management. Further, a commensurate allocation of financial resources must be available to support implementation of these programs.
Readily available biosafety and biosecurity technical literature is key to disseminating the principles and practices of biorisk management to the user community. Such literature would include: guidelines or standards published by the local government, other governments, or non-governmental organizations; textbooks; publications of biosafety societies; applied biosafety research articles; and instructional manuals. Each of these valuable instruments ensures the user community has a means to self-educate and remain current regarding progress and innovations in biosafety made by cohorts in other communities. National or regional biosafety associations can play an important role in disseminating and where applicable, translating this information in lowresource countries. The expanding use of computers and broad availability of the Internet should result in greater ease of distribution and access to this information.
Due to a lack of biosafety information or knowledge of where information resides, senior leaders and decision makers sometimes lack a broad appreciation for the importance of biosafety and biosecurity best practices. Consequently, funding for biosafety and biosecurity is insufficient or essentially non-existent as these issues go unrecognized or are under prioritized. To complicate the situation, there is often a general absence of awareness of best practices at the laboratory level as well. In lowresource countries, development partners can help get local governments to commit to increased funding necessary to improve worker safety and pathogen security via awareness-raising activities including seminars and leave-behind informative literature targeted to elected officials, Ministry representatives, and laboratory senior management.
The general absence of awareness of best practices may be due, in part, to the dearth of subject matter content available in languages other than English. This lack of technical material printed in local languages is an important issue for non-English speaking scientists, technicians and managers eager for this information. It also increases the challenges for Development partners that provide biosafety and biosecurity trainers. Therefore, existing national and international biosafety guidelines should be translated into those languages representative of low-resource countries. Development partners are often eager to support this type of activity since it results in a tangible product with a measurable impact.
To overcome the lack of technical guidance materials available in languages other than English, lowresource countries should either translate these materials locally or approach the organizations and agencies that developed the documents and request translated materials. To ensure accuracy, development partners should encourage bilingual subject matter experts in biosafety in these countries to review the translated materials prior to publication. When necessary, international development partners could help fund the cost of translation. Translated materials should receive the broadest distribution possible via postings on multiple websites, including that of the development partner, the appropriate country Ministry(s), as well as the national, regional, and international biosafety associations.
Scientists and laboratory directors in low-resource countries are responsible for improving biosafety awareness at the local level. These professionals can proactively share information among their colleagues and discuss policy solutions as issues arise. To attract funding for biosafety and biosecurity improvements, scientists and laboratory directors should actively seek collaborative relationships with organizations in more developed countries with robust biosafety and biosecurity capacities by making specific inquiries to academic, medical, and corporate enterprises. Various government agencies and programs, the International Federation of Biosafety Associations (IFBA), and other members of the international funding community are well positioned to facilitate these relationships, potentially fund collaborative projects, and establish twinning arrangements.
Infrastructure
Low-resource countries generally suffer a range of significant challenges associated with a lack of national infrastructure (e.g., absence of functional water purification and intact distribution systems, reliable electrical power, quality roadways and transportation networks, www.absa.org
Applied Biosafety Vol. 16, No. 4, 2011 adequate codes for construction and fire safety). While these challenges are beyond the scope of this article, these potentially overwhelming problems can negatively impact how containment laboratories and vivaria operate. Few members of the development community are in a position to address these challenges and such efforts are typically not well integrated across funding organizations. Decisions, actions, and funding to address national-level infrastructure problems often remain the responsibility of the low-resource country as its part of the inkind contribution to projects. In addition to national infrastructure, laboratory infrastructure has a direct and immediate impact on biosafety and biosecurity, as well. Existing laboratories in low-resource countries may suffer from a myriad of infrastructure problems typically associated with poorquality starting materials combined with inadequate systems maintenance. The root of the problem is that laboratory operation budgets are typically inadequate to support the full cost of infrastructure improvement, routine maintenance, utility expenses, supplies and staff compensation. Consequently, individual laboratories, and sometimes entire facilities, are temporarily closed to save money. Conversations with facility directors and ministers in many low-resource countries consistently reveal the same problem: Existing national budgets are inadequate to maintain or replace these systems. International development partners that wish to help resolve these issues should approach the situation cautiously and with the awareness that the solution to any single issue can be costly and, arguably, futile. Development partners will be limited in how much they can enhance biosafety and biosecurity in low-resource countries unless all of the coexisting infrastructure challenges are identified and resolved simultaneously. While a comprehensive assessment of all facility systems is advisable prior to initiating improvements, this audit may show that it is less expensive and time-consuming to simply construct a new laboratory. This approach also has its challenges, as discussed below.
In developed countries, biocontainment facility design, construction, and operation have proven to be a very expensive endeavor. As the containment level of the laboratory increases, so does the cost and complexity of its systems. Modern high-containment laboratories require expert architectural design, specialized materials, careful workmanship from highly skilled workers, and technologically advanced systems engineering controls. The construction must conform to local codes. These high-biocontainment facilities operate with a high energy requirement, expensive technology, automated systems, safety equipment, and personal protective equipment. In low-resource countries numerous challenges are associated with acquiring and maintaining the containment laboratory infrastructure. These may include: the absence of laboratory design requirements or standards applicable for use in local settings; the inability to develop "design intent" documentation for use by the architectural and engineering firm; minimal input from endusers; too few appropriately skilled and experienced construction workers; absence of commissioning expertise; limited (if any) routine preventative maintenance; and a lack of experienced and full-time facility engineers. Although recommendations for each of these challenges are presented below, it is essential for representatives of low-resource countries to consider, pre-construction, the actual requirement for moving beyond biosafety level 2 containment laboratories and to recognize their country's financial capability to sustainably operate and maintain high-or maximum-containment laboratories or vivaria.
If it is determined that constructing a high containment facility is required, designers should take into account the country-or region-specific needs, capabilities, and resources. Unfortunately, none of the few laboratory construction guidance documents addresses laboratory or vivarium construction in low-resource countries (Mani et al., 2006; NIH, 2008; USDA, 2002) . Consequently, it would be helpful for international funding partners or biosafety associations to engage architects and engineers to develop options for low-resource countries and to support the translation of these new publications into multiple languages. Technical experts in national, regional, and international biosafety associations could additionally work directly with architectural and engineering firms, local and major international construction companies, and facility systems manufacturers to help these firms focus on the unique end-user needs in low-resource countries. The associations and technical experts should identify reasonable options for laboratory design and construction involving lower cost, locally available materials and construction processes that involve less technical sophistication and specialized workmanship. The engineering solutions should be local, practical and sustainable (J. Welch, personal communication).
One of the most challenging aspects of building a containment facility is gaining a clear understanding of the performance requirements, or design intent, for the facility from the end-user. Developing a design intent document is crucial to enable an architectural and engineering firm to provide the end-user with a suitable facility. Challenges associated with creating the design intent document can be overcome to some extent through consultation with appropriately qualified technical experts within national or regional biosafety associations.
Design problems notwithstanding, very few capable and experienced containment facility construction companies exist in most low-resource countries. Laboratories and vivaria, particularly those at biosafety level 3 and above, require specialized construction skills, materials, and workmanship. Unfortunately, there are too many examples of non-operational facilities and those that cannot be operated safely due to design and /or con-struction failure. International funding partners should insist upon using an experienced commissioning team to prevent, identify, and address flaws through all phases of laboratory design and construction. In the rare cases where local commissioning standards do exist in a low-resource country, it is still difficult, if not impossible, to find local, knowledgeable, and experienced commissioning companies familiar with these standards. In these circumstances, outside experts will be necessary. Through raising awareness of the correct process and with international partner support, it is possible to complete the commissioning process and build wellconstructed containment facilities.
Construction and commissioning challenges are just one hurdle to the development and expansion of biosafety and biosecurity capacity in low-resource countries. Another barrier is poor maintenance. It has been estimated that the annual maintenance budget for highcontainment laboratories is often 10%-15% of the facility construction cost. Maintenance budgets are often overlooked during the initial facility planning, design, and budgeting process with few resources allocated for longterm maintenance, creating a false sense of confidence in the containment provided by the building systems.
Containment facilities require full-time, dedicated engineering staff to continually maintain the facility's unique systems and equipment. It is crucial for successful facility operations to include these labor and equipment preservation costs in the operations and maintenance budget. In most low-resource countries, finding facilities that employ full-time engineers is rare and engineers are brought in as local tradesmen only when problems arise. In other cases, maintenance is not even recognized as a task requiring permanent staff, and instead is re-tendered annually or biannually. As maintenance costs are considered a burden, service contracts are typically awarded to the lowest bidder; this may result in poor facility and equipment performance. Increasing awareness among the highest level government officials regarding the importance of laboratory and vivaria design, construction, operations, and maintenance is the best way to overcome laboratory infrastructure challenges and ensure ongoing availability of appropriate technical expertise. Additionally, development partners need to gain long-term commitment from the recipient partner that future budgets will cover projected operations and maintenance costs. Design, construction, and commissioning efforts must involve a mix of technically qualified expatriate labor matched with local nationals who will learn from the experience and remain in-country as a resource post-construction.
Equipment, Reagents, and Services
Operating clinical, diagnostic, and research laboratories requires a myriad of laboratory equipment and consumable reagents. In low-resource countries, the purchase and use of equipment, reagents, and support services present major challenges for the laboratories and the supporting development partners. As detailed below, these challenges include: availability of qualified individuals to inspect, maintain, repair, and certify specialized equipment items; unavailability of equipment, reagents, and services outside of capital cities; prohibitive costs for equipment, reagents, and services; over-engineered safety equipment that is too complex and energyintensive for use in low-resource countries; excessive transport costs for heavy or temperature-sensitive items; and disposal problems with personal protective equipment (PPE) and laboratory materials.
Lack of availability of equipment, reagents, and support services presents a major challenge to biosafety and biosecurity capacity in low-resource countries. While a full range of these resources may be obtainable in select capital cities, they are often not available in less accessible areas. Until these materials are accessible through the local or national economy, biosafety program objectives will remain unsustainable. Development partners should help low-resource countries create and foster a business environment in which equipment manufacturers, distributors, reagent producers, and scientific service providers can compete and flourish. This will require conversations with senior government officials.
Some of the most important pieces of safety equipment operating in a containment laboratory are containment barriers. The standard example of this is the biological safety cabinet (BSC). Unfortunately, BSCs are underused, or simply not available, when they should be used according to best practices. A study by AstutoGribble et al. (2000) found that BSCs are used by only 64% of researchers who study pathogens that pose an inhalational hazard. Due to their importance in supporting biosafety in the laboratory and vivarium, funding partners would like to see more BSCs used. Unfortunately, in many parts of the world, funders cannot easily purchase BSCs locally, so they purchase them from U.S., Western European or Asian firms and ship them to the end-user facility. Given the size and weight of a BSC, transportation fees can equal the purchase priceeffectively doubling the cost of each unit. Local experts to maintain, repair, or certify BSCs are similarly scarce and are often flown in at great cost to the institution. Working with infectious agents in a BSC that has not been properly positioned in the lab and certified is potentially more dangerous than working on the open bench. The creation of a business environment that allows equipment manufacturers, distributors, and scientific service providers to flourish would help neutralize this challenge.
Development partners, as well as national, regional, and international biosafety associations, should work with equipment manufacturers to identify product characteristics and functions that meet the needs of scien-www.absa.org
Applied Biosafety Vol. 16, No. 4, 2011
tists in low-resource countries. For example, BSCs could be redesigned to be lighter weight and locally manufactured (i.e., constructed by less skilled craftsmen using readily available materials) with lower power requirements and clearly marked visual indicators that tell the operator the cabinet is operating within performance specifications. Since manufacturers are likely to find more sales at the bottom of the pyramid than at the top (Prahalad, 2009) , information obtained from end-users should be used to frugally engineer the equipment (Sehgal et al., 2010) . Another potential solution is to rely less on modern safety equipment to reduce risk, and instead combine a thorough risk assessment with procedural modifications. These modifications should include procedures to reduce the generation of potentially infectious aerosols, encourage strong microbiological technique, and the use of appropriate PPE, such as respiratory protection, when recommended by the risk assessment. While this approach does not eliminate the requirement for BSCs in all situations, it may provide a reasonable alternative without compromising worker safety.
Management Processes and Administrative Controls
Practical organizational structures with effective management processes are critical components of a responsible biosafety program. Successfully integrating biosafety throughout an entire facility requires the presence of a dedicated Biosafety Director/ Officer with the authority to develop and implement a comprehensive biosafety program. The system works best when all parties recognize the institutional authority of the Biosafety Director, complete their individual assignments willingly, and remain fully engaged in the compliance process.
Even though the international biosafety community values the principles and practices of biosafety and biosecurity, senior managers in low-resource countries may not prioritize, or endorse, the managerial and administrative processes required to implement such practices. In many countries organizational structures frequently lack a safety department, a Biosafety Officer, a designated Institutional Biosafety Committee, an Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee, and /or an Ethical Review Committee. Therefore, scientists and technicians attempting to implement sound biosafety practices at the bench will continually struggle in the absence of biosafety and biosecurity support at the top of the organization.
The European Committee for Standardization (CEN) Workshop Agreement (CWA) 15793:2008 (European Committee for Standardization, 2008) is a powerful tool that permits organizations to conduct self-assessments and identify those management processes and administrative controls needed to ensure effective biosafety and biosecurity implementation. Heightened awareness, translating internationally accepted technical documents into local languages, and providing international support in applying the management standard CWA 15793:2008 could go a long way in solving the issues related to the lack of administrative controls.
Biosafety Curricula
In many countries there is a demonstrated lack of understanding about the concepts of biosafety and biosecurity among scientists, laboratory managers, institute directors, and elected officials. Training biosafety practitioners, scientists, and management personnel would help address a portion of this problem. More important, safety and biosafety at the workplace should be integrated into and modeled in undergraduate and graduate laboratory courses. Instilling these principles into future biosafety professionals and scientists before they enter the workforce would help establish an integrated culture of safety in containment facilities. Ideally, professional biosafety associations, working with colleges and universities, would design and offer formal biosafety modules as a proactive way to shift from passive in-lab training to active instruction for the next generation of scientists and biosafety professionals. This approach would reach students at a formative period in their professional training and help ensure biosafety and biosecurity best practices become part of the backdrop of these individuals' future work routines.
The national and private biomedical research funding organizations in each country should require that any scientific staff receiving grant support participate in annual biosafety refresher training as well as demonstrate competency in biosafety best practices related to their area of work. The international funding community should subsidize these initiatives as well as endorse the current IFBA initiative to create and implement a biosafety and biosecurity curriculum that culminates in an internationally recognized diploma.
Training
Training is a highly effective means of changing norms and paradigms. Developing expert training staff via a Train-the-Trainer model is an efficient way to initiate and maintain long-term change in biosafety practices in low-resource countries or regions. A national or regional biosafety association can provide leadership by identifying individuals qualified to become the next generation of trainers within each country. Unfortunately, this process has been hampered by the lack of training materials in the appropriate language that can be provided to the local trainers and left in-country as a resource.
The WHO, various other government agencies, and a very few private-sector organizations provide biosafety and biosecurity support and training throughout the world. Their efforts would be exponentially enhanced if the training materials developed for these efforts were consolidated and more widely used through the www.absa.org
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Vol. 16, No. 4, 2011 national, regional, and international biosafety associations. Regardless of the source, any training program needs comprehensive buy-in from the local or regional biosafety associations. For English-speaking countries, a wealth of free biosafety and biosecurity training materials is available on the web sites of the IFBA (www.internationalbiosafety.org) and the American Biological Safety Association (ABSA) (www.absa.org).
Biosafety Associations, Professional Competency, and Credentialing
A biosafety association is a non-profit, apolitical group of like-minded professionals committed to sharing resources, experiences, and problem-solving approaches for their mutual benefit and furthering knowledge in biosafety and biosecurity. Biosafety associations are intended to support the biosafety and biosecurity objectives of individuals as well as government, commercial, academic, and private organizations. These associations play a critical role in disseminating information to their constituent members while simultaneously presenting members' knowledge to government decision makers formulating guidelines and policy. Biosafety associations exist at the local, state, national, regional, and global levels. Some examples of long-standing national associations include ABSA, the Canadian Association of Biological Safety, and the Biosafety and Biosecurity Association of Brazil; regional biosafety associations include the Asia-Pacific Biosafety Association (A-PBA) and the European Biological Safety Association-each of which separately represents over 20 different countries in its region. IFBA, a global biosafety organization, is currently composed of 17 different national and regional member organizations that collectively represent over 120 different countries.
National biosafety associations are rare in lowresource countries simply because of the lack of support and endorsement from national, academic, and corporate organizations. The development community should support the establishment of biosafety associations by actively communicating the purpose and mission of such organizations to local government officials. The international community can also support scientists and biosafety professionals working to establish local biosafety associations.
Securing adequate funding for the operation of a biosafety association can be challenging. Membership fees are sometimes viewed as a barrier to success for start-up biosafety associations to the extent these fees may discourage prospective members from joining. It is important to note, however, that the majority of revenue for the operation of a biosafety association often comes from the payment of registration fees to the annual conference and to pre-conference training courses and not from membership dues. Start-up biosafety associations could potentially identify corporate, non-government, or federal sponsors to support the organization's operating costs, and work to reduce their operating costs in general, with the goal of lowering or eliminating membership fees in low-resource countries.
Two regional biosafety associations, the African Biosafety Association (AfBSA) and A-PBA, have worked together to form an outreach and seed program that fosters biosafety in their respective geographical regions. The program has proven remarkably successful and should serve as a model for marketing biosafety associations around the world. Annual conferences are held in different locations, thus increasing potential support across the region. In preparation for the annual conference, these regional associations reach out to the local microbiology, virology, and human / animal health professionals of the host country and help them to organize their own national biosafety association. With these actions, the regional biosafety associations are driving the creation of national biosafety associations. For example, the AfBSA and A-PBA provide financial and personnel support until the local committee can effectively operate its own association. This successful model proves biosafety associations can help one another further their shared purposes.
Another major challenge to building biosafety and biosecurity capacity in low-resource countries is the absence of a relevant biosafety credentialing system. Only the United States has a formal biosafety credentialing system. This system is administered by ABSA and two designations are available: Certified Biological Safety Professional (CBSP) (www.absa.org/ biocert.html) and Registered Biosafety Professional (RBP) (www.absa.org/ bioreg.html). The cost of obtaining and maintaining these credentials is a significant, if not impossible, financial burden for biosafety professionals in low-resource countries. To overcome these challenges, low-resource countries should support organizations (regional / national / global biosafety associations) in the development of credentialing requirements that are relevant and maintainable by biosafety professionals in the country or region.
Individual Mentoring and Organizational Twinning
Junior biosafety practitioners, career scientists, laboratory managers, and others new to the field of biosafety can benefit from mentoring. IFBA and ABSA administer a mentoring program that pairs individuals with mentors and takes cultural and geographical considerations into account. The mentor is expected to assist with technical questions, provide recommended readings about issues related to biosafety and biosecurity, and assist with professional introductions to other members in the field.
The institutional equivalent to mentoring is organizational twinning. Twinning allows young or developing biosafety associations to benefit from the knowledge and experience gained by existing national or regional www.absa.org
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Summary and Conclusions
Creative solutions exist to make the seemingly insurmountable challenges, of implementing and expanding biosafety and biosecurity capacity in low-resource countries, very achievable tasks. The process begins by bringing together knowledgeable local professionals, in a variety of different leadership positions, who understand the risks associated with the manipulation, transport, and storage of pathogens. With the help of international funding partners, these individuals can identify gaps in their biosafety and biosecurity risk management and thoughtfully identify and assign country-specific resources to mitigate these risks. When assistance from the international funding community is requested, or even required, it is incumbent upon the low-resource country to carefully assign these resources for maximum value. Most important, responsible officials from the lowresource country must help these containment facilities become self-sufficient by creating a viable sustainability plan that transitions all program costs from the funder to the recipient over a defined period of time.
While supporting low-resource countries in the development and application of appropriate biosafety and biosecurity best practices is challenging, funding partners and low-resource countries need to acknowledge these challenges in order to work together to overcome them. As stated by Chua et al. (2009) , "In our quest to provide a safer world today and for the generations to come, we must shift our consciousness from national responsibility to one of a global responsibility…from a national community to a global community."
